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IN THE SUPRE!,lE COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THURMAN DAVID HEABERLIN and 
MARGIE HEABERLIN, his wife, 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
vs. 
CITY OF FUN CARNIVAL, a 







Case No. 15,214 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Respondents agree with appellants statement of the 
nature of the case. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Respondents disagree with the appellants statement of 
the disposition in the lower court. 
Plaintiffs-appellants filed this action nearly seven 
years ago, on December 16, 1970, (R. 263-264) to determine 
the existence of a partnership, to disolve the partnership, 
and to have an accounting and distribution. On January 3, 
1972, slightly over a year later, defendants-respondents 
fil(•d their Notice of Readiness to Trial, (R. 226) to which 
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--
the plaintiffs-appellants objected. (R. 224). On April 28 , 
1972, defendants-respondents filed a Motion for Summary 
Judgment on the question of the terms of the partnership 
and the validity of a written partnership agreement between 
the parties. (R. 216). The Notion was expressly based on 
the depositions of Thurman David Heaberlin, Hargie Heaberlin 
and Louis Melendez, Jr. On July 19, 1972, the trial court 
denied the motion for summary judgment specifically because 
the deposition of Margie Heaberlin had not been filed. (R, 
200). Thereafter, Margie Heaberlin's deposition was filed. 
A pre-trial conference was held on November 3, 1972. 
(R. 197). At that time the court bifurcated the trial, the 
first phase was to be "What was the Partnership?" and the 
second phase was to be the "Accounting". (R. 197). Pursuan: 
to the pre-trial conference discussions, counsel for both 
parties submitted supplemental authorities on defendant-
respondents previous motion for summary judgment on the 
issue of the partnership. (R. 192, 194). Oral arguments 
were held on the motion for summary judgment on January 5, 
1973. (R. 188). The trial court entered its order grantinj 
summary judgment and ruled that the signed, written agree-
ment between the parties, (Deposition of Thurman David 
Heaberlin, Exhibit 1) was and is the partnership agreement 
between the parties on January 18, 1973. (R. 187). This 
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Thereafter plaintiffs-appellants filed a Motion to 
Alter and Amend Order and Judgment and a Motion for New 
Trial on Order and Summary Judgment dated the 26th day of 
January, 1973. (R. 185). Shortly thereafter, defendant-
respondent filed a second Motion for Summary Judgment on the 
issue of dissolution and accounting. (R. 138). Plaintiffs-
Appellants Motion to alter and amend the judgment and for a 
New Trial and Defendant-Respondent's Motion for Summary 
Judgment came on for oral argument together on the 13th day 
of April, 1973, at which time both Motions were denied. (R. 
940). 
On the 6th day of February, 1974, this matter came on 
for what was to be the trial on the issue of accounting. 
(R. 43). The court decided, at that time, however, that a 
master would be appointed to take evidence and to determine 
the accounting and the dissolution of the partnership. (R. 
43). Thereafter on the 1st day of March, 1977, defendant-
respondent renewed its Motion for Summary Judgment on the 
issue of the accounting. Oral arguments on the renewed 
Motion were had on April 8, 1977. (R. 24). On April 15, 
1977, the court entered its Order and Judgment granting 
defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment in all respects and 
granting defendants a judgment. It is from that Order and 
Judgment that plaintiff-appellant appeals. (R. 16). 
-3-
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RELIEF SOUGllT ON APPEAL 
The respondents request this Court to affirm the judg-
ments of the trial court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondents disagree with the statement of facts as set 
forth by appellant in certain 1"atters. Before respondents se: 
out the facts of the dealings of the parties with each 
other, there is one statement of fact in appellants' brief 
to which respondents believe they should first respond. 
Appellants state on page 9 of their brief that Judge Joseph 
E. Nelson signed a Restraining Order which was to restrain 
the defendants from certain types of conduct. Counsel for 
appellants did in fact prepare and file a motion for such a 
restraining order and did prepare a proposed restraining 
order. (R. 252-256). However, contrary to the statement in 
appellants' brief on page 9, Judge Nelson did not sign the 
restraining order (R. 253) nor is there any return of servic: 
in the record indicating that the defendants have ever been 
served with any order, nor were the defendants ever in fact 
served with any restraining order in this matter. The 
minute entry of the hearing on the t,lotion for the restrainir 
order which was held February 5, 1971, inclicates that his 
motion was denied. (R. p. 252). 
Respondents make the following additions or correction' 
to appellants statement regarding the dealings of the parll' 
with each other. l~hile, as appellants state, appellants an: 
respondents began \vorking together in the spring of 1964, t' 
-4-
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did not immediately enter into a specific oral partnership 
agreement. (Deposition of Lou Melendez, p. 18-24). In 
fact, as late as July of 1965, Mr. Heaberlin indicated in a 
letter to Nr. Melendez that their arrangement was with "no 
strings attached". (Deposition of Lou Melendez, p. 26 Line 
12 top. 27 Line 10). 
Thereafter appellants and respondents began working on 
a written agreement which appellants read and worked on 
several times over a long period of time and which was signed 
by all parties on April 18, 1967. (Exhibit 1, Deposition of 
Thurman David Heaberlin, p. 9-11, p. 28 Line 4-13; Deposition 
of Lou Melendez p. 25-30; Deposition of Margie Heaberlin, p. 
14, Line 19). The agreement is set out in full in appellants 
brief on Pages 5-8. 
The partnership agreement entered into between appellants 
(David and Margie Heaberlin) and respondent (Louis Melendez) 
provides as follows regarding dissolution: 
10. Dave, if he elects to leave the firm 
will never be allowed to leave with any 
piece of property except for the inventory 
he filed at beginning of agreement and any 
added to list by Lou bought personally by 
Dave - all additions are to be signed for 
by Lou. 
12. As carnival is efficient only in size 
at no time will the unit ever be divided 
for disolvement of partnership. 
13. Dave will be paid, in case if disolve-
ment, price agreed upon or by am?unt of_ 
stock paid into corporation by h1m and 1n 
no case more than the $25,000.00 agreed pur-
chase price and in same time period as paid 
for unless otherwise agreed upon. 
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The partnership agreement provides that upon dis-
solution, appellants will get (l) Inventory of equipment 
brought into partnership, (2) Amount paid into partnership 
but not more than $25,000.00. When appellant left, he to~ 
with him all of his personal property, the items in No, 1 
above, a 1967 station wagon, a house trailer, and $l,lOO.OQ 
which was paid to him by respondents at the meeting between 
respondents and appellants and their respective attorneys, 
(Deposition of Thurman David Heaberlin, p. 18-21). 
The only amount appellant had paid into the partnersh~ 
pursuant to paragraph 8 and 13 was a credit of $776.50 as 
l/2 of a check retained by Lou Melendez in the amount of 
$1,553.00. (Deposition of Thurman David Heaberlin p. 13); 
Deposition of Lou Melendez, p. 38 Lines 24-40, Line 22, 
Affidavit of Lou Melendez, R. 37). The cash paid appellant 
just prior to his leaving, therefore, represented a payment 
of the amount due to appellant under paragraphs 8 and 13, 
plus an additional $323.50. 
Respondents deny that appellants left the partnership 
pursuant to a mutual termination as asserted in their brief 
on Page 9. The circumstances around appellants leaving are 
as follows: 
In In May of 1970, appellant David Heaberlin had an arg~­
ment with Lou Melendez, which Mr. Heaberlin describes as 
"mostly my fault." (Deposition of Thurman David Heaberlin, 
p. 17, Line 7). A couple of weeks later t-lr. Heaberlin met 
-6-
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with his counsel, Mr. Taylor; the respondent, Mr. Melendez; 
and respondents' counsel, Mr. Lewis. It was agreed at that 
meeting that Mr. Heaberlin would stay with the carnival and 
some talk was had of a possible re-negotiation of the existing 
partnership agreement. (Deposition of Thurman David Heaberlin, 
p. 17 Line 19-22). At that meeting Mr. Heaberlin was paid 
$1,100.00. (Deposition of Thurman David Heaberlin p. 18, 
Lines 7-14). After the meeting, Mr. Heaberlin said he 
"changed his mind and decided not to stay in the company." 
(Deposition of Thurman David Heaberlin, p. 18, Lines 17-18). 
Mr. Heaberlin then took his own personal belongings, his 
shop truck, a house trailer and a station wagon and, without 
contacting Mr. Melendez, voluntarily left the business and 
went to California. (Deposition of Thurman David Heaberlin, 
p. 18-21). 
POINT I 
APPELLANTS ARE PRECLUDED FROM CONTESTING THE TRIAL 
COURT'S ORDER OF SUMMARY JUDG~IENT DATED JANUARY 17, 1973, 
BECAUSE OF THEIR FAILURE TO FILE A NOTICE OF INTENT TO APPEAL 
PURSUANT TO RULE 72(a). 
The trial court bifurcated this matter for trial. (R. 
195). The frist trial was to have determined "What was the 
Partnership Agreement?" and the second trial was to have 
determined an accounting of the dissolution of the partner-
ship. (R. 195). Prior to the first trial, however, the 
court granted sum~ary judgment ruling that the written 
agreement between the parties (Deposition of Thurman David 
-7-
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Haberlin, Exhibit 1) was the partnership agreement. (R. 
187). Plaintiffs, recognizing that this was a final judg-
ment as to the issues of the.first scheduled trial, filed a 
"Motion to Alter or Amend Order and Judgment and a Motion 
for a New Trial on Order and Summary Judgment" and stated 
therein that they were doing so pursuant to Rule 59 Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. The trial court denied plain-
tiffs motions on April 18, 1975. No notice of appeal was 
filed pursuant to Rule 72(a) until April 28, 1977, more 
than two years after the court entered its order denying 
plaintiffs' motion to alter or amend the judgment or for a 
new trial. 
Rule 72(a) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides 
that: 
An appeal may be taken to the Supreme 
Court from all final orders and judg-
ments in accordance with these rules; 
provided, that when other claims re-
main to be determined in the proceed-
ings, a party may preserve his right 
to appeal on the decided issue until a 
final determination of the other claims 
by filing with the trial court and 
serving on the adverse parties within 
the time provided in Rule 73(a), a no-
tice of his intention to do so. 
Rule 73(a) provides that the time within which an appeal may 
be taken is one month from the entry of the judgment. 
Therefore, if plaintiffs had desired to preserve their right 
to appeal on the j uclgment issued by the court on January 11, 
1973, they would have had to have filed their Notice of 
Intention to Appeal within one month from April 18, 1975. 
No notice of intent to appeal was filed within that one 
-8-
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mo0th pe~iod, and, the~efo~e, this Cou~t does not have 
ju~isdiction to review the trial court's Summary Judgment of 
January 17, 1973. 
The~e are no cases interpreting this rule as it now 
stands. The cases presented herein all interpret the rule 
prior to the last amendment by the Supreme Court. The rule 
was significantly amended on June 23, 1971, which was more 
than six months prior to the court's entry of summary judg-
ment herein and was approximately two years prior to the 
court's denial of the plaintiffs' motion for a new trial. 
The amendment added final "Orders" to final "Judgments" 
from which on appeal could be taken and inserted the pro-
vision for preserving the right to appeal on a "decided 
issue". (See compiler's notes to Rule 72(a) 1975 Pocket 
Supplement to Volume 9 Utah Code Annotated 1953). 
Prior to this amendment, the Supreme Court had been 
extremely reluctant to find many types of orders and judg-
ments to be final orders from which an appeal would lie. 
With this amendment, however, the court broadened the appli-
cation of Rule 72 to not only final judgments disposing of 
the entire case but also to orders and judgments which 
finally decide a particular issue while not determining all 
claims set forth in a particular case. 
The Supreme Court, by its amendment, established the 
procedure by which a party could preserve his right to 
appeal on any such decided issue until the final determi-
nation of all the other issues and claims. Such a procedure 
-9-
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seems to specifically cover the situation involved herein. 
In this matter, the trial court bifurcated the issues and 
scheduled two separate trials. The granting of the summary 
judgment disposed of the issues of the first trial and left 
only the issue of an accounting of the dissolution of the 
partnership. Such an order of summary judgment fits clearly 
within the definition of "final orders and judgment" as 
contemplated by Rule 7 2 (a) as amended. There fore, by their 
failure to preserve their right to appeal that judgment, they 
are precluded from appealinq that decision at this time. 
Even prior to the 1971 amendment expanding the types of 
orders from which one must file a notice of appeal in order 
to preserve his right to appeal, this Court has held that a 
judgment which leaves only the matter of an accounting to~ 
determined is a final order from which an appeal lies. 
Wheelright v. Roman, 50 Utah 10, 165 P. 513 (1917). While 
respondents concede that the facts of that case are not 
identical with the instant case, respondents cite the case 
for the proposition that the fact that an accounting remain~ 
to be made did not stop a judgment from being considered 
final. 
One case which was decided prior to the amendment of 
the rule which clearly states the spirit of the rule and the 
position which respondents take herein, is the case of 
Hayward v. Voorhees, 12 Utah 2d 361, 366 P.2d 977 (1961). 
The court therein stated: 
-10-
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Respondents raise an issue as to the 
timeline3s of the appeal from the decree 
of October 2, 1959. It must be con-
ceded that if the decree was appealable 
at the time of its entry, no appeal was 
taken within the one month allowed by 
Rule 73{a), U.R.C.P. The appellants 
assert that it was not then final and 
therfore, not appealable because of the 
proviso that the court retained juris-
diction "for the purpose of adjudicating 
any matter which may arise under the memo-
randum pending the final creation of the 
trust". They point to the fact that there 
has been no formal setting up of the 
trust. It is appreciated that because 
of the factor just mentioned and that 
the two proceedings, the probate and the 
civil suit, were involved, there may be 
some justification for uncertainty as to 
the status of that judgment. However, 
cutting through the brush of the attemp-
ted procedural forensics, it will be 
seen that the real issue between the 
parties and before the court was whether 
the mountain ground belonged to Mrs. 
Voorhees or to the estate. Upon pre-
liminary hearing thereon, the issue was 
resolved against her. The fact that the 
court retained jurisdiction as mentioned 
above to adjudicate further matters, did 
not leave open for reconsideration the 
question as to who owned that property. 
There was nothing further to be decided 
on that particular issue and she was 
ordered to transfer it to the estate. At 
being so, the decree entered thereon was 
final and therefore appealable. Since 
she took no appeal within the time allowed 
by law, that decree is conclusive. (12 
Utah 2d at 366). (Emphasis added). 
In the instant matter, the primary determination was 
the terms of the partnership. After the determination of 
the terms of the partnership it is essentially a mechanical 
]rocess to account for the dissolution of the partnership 
und0r whatever terms are deterMined. Once the court had 
3rant0d summary judgment establishing that the written 
-11-
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agreement between the parties was in fact the partnership 
agreement, there was nothing further to be decided on that 
central issue. Nov1 that the rule has been expanded to in-
clude orders and judgments which dispose of one issue rather 
than all issues, certainly a summary judgment which left 
only an accounting and determined the terms of the partner-
ship is an order or judgment within the contemplation of 
this rule. The order and judgment entered January 18, 1973, 
was therefore a final order or judgment within the meaning 
of Rule 72(a) and because appellants failed to preserve 
their right to appeal by failing to file a notice of intent 
to appeal within the time allowed by law, that order is 
conclusive on the matter of the terms of the partnership. 
POINT II 
EVEN IF THIS COURT HOLDS THAT THE TRIAL COURT'S FIRST 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS PROPERLY BEFORE THIS COURT 
FOR REVIEW, THE TRIAL COURT'S SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS PROPER 
AND SHOULD BE SUSTAINED. 
The partnership, the terms of which are in dispute 
herein, was entered into sometime after the Spring of 1964, 
nearly 14 years ago, and was disolved in 1970, nearly eight 
years ago. This is the very type of situation contemplated 
by the development of the concepts behind the Statute of 
Frauds, the parol evidence rule and the best evidence rule. 
Men's memories go dim or fail completely or are influenced 
by their prejudices and desires. In such a situation whet-
there is a 1vriting 1vhich both parties achli.t having read a!' 
-12-
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signed, it is the wise policy of the courts to use the 
written agreement to ~easure the rights and liabilities of 
the parties. 59 Am.Jur.2d, Partnership, Section 33. 
After Mr. Heaberlin and Mr. Melendez began working 
together, a partnership agreement was drafted to state the 
rights and obligations of each in preparation to forming a 
corporation. This was negotiated and prepared over a long 
period of time and was finally signed April 18, 1967. 
(Exhibit l, Deposition of Thurman David Heaberlin p. 9, 10, 
11, 28 L. 4-13; Louis 11elendez deposition p. 25-30). The 
document was read by Mr. Heaberlin several times over a long 
period of time and several corrections were made at his 
insistance. (Deposition of Thurman David Heaberlin, p. 11, 
Deposition of Louis Melendez, p. 26-29, Deposition of Margie 
Heaberlin, Exhibits land 2). Finally on April 18, 1967, 
the agreement was signed by Thurman David Heaberlin (Deposi-
tion of Thurman David Heaberlin p. 11, Line 4, 20), Louis 
l·lelendez. (Deposition of Louis Melendez, p. 28 Line 20), 
and Margie Heaberlin. 
Linel9). 
(Deposition of Margie Heaberlin p. 14 
There is no contention that any other writing was ever 
entered into that modified the written agreement of April 
18, 1967, nor is there any contention that it was cancelled, 
rescinded or revoked prior to its disolution by plaintiffs' 
voluntary leaving the business in 1970. 
59 Am.Jur.2d Partnership Section 33 states "while a 
written agreement is not necessary, where it does exist it 
-13-
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constitutes the measure of the partners rights and lia-
bilities". Section 76 of the same article states that, as 
to proof of the terms of the partnership, "the best evidence 
consists of the agreement or contract between the parties". 
Section 76 further states that only when no ~1riting is 
available does one turn to the transactions, conduct and 
declarations of the parties. Section 37 also adds: 
The general principle that when the 
parties to a contract have reduced the 
terms to writing in unambiguous terms, 
parol evidence will not be received to 
substitute a new contract, applies to 
partnership agreements. 
Appellants contentions that there are material facts 
which are still in issue ignore the law and the facts herein, 
The material facts appellant contends are still in issue 
are: 
A. Was there an oral partnership agreement 
between the parties? 
B. Did the pre-incorporation agreement modify the 
oral partnership agreement? 
c. What were the terms of the partnership 
agreement? 
Questions A and B, are answered by the Parol Evidence 
Rule. The rule and its rationale are set out in 30 Am.Jur.2: 
Evidence, Section 1016: 
The well established general rule is that 
where the parties to a contract have 
deliberately put their engagement in 
writing in such ter::1s as import a legal 
obligation without any uncertainty as 
to the object or extent of such engage-
-14-
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ment, it is conclusively presumed that 
the entire engagement of the parties, 
and the extent and manner of their under-
taking, have been reduced to writing, and 
all oarol evidence of prior or contempGr= 
aneoue conversations or declarations ten-
ding to substitute a new and different 
co~t:act.for the one evidenced by the 
wr1t1ng 1s Incompetent. Stated otherwise, 
the intention of the parties as evidenced 
by the legal import of the language of a 
valid written contract cannot ordinarily 
be varied by parol proof of a different 
intention .• 
The parol evidence rule is founded upon 
the principle that when the parties have 
discussed and agreed upon their obliga-
tions to each other and reduced those 
terms to writing, the writing, if clear 
and unambiguous, furnishes better and 
more definite evidence of what was under-
taken by each party than the memory of man, 
and applies to exclude extrinsic utterances 
when it is sought to use those utterances 
for the purpose for which the writing was 
made, such writing superseding them as the 
legal act. The instrument itself is re-
garded as the best evidence of what the 
parties intended, and the writing still 
remains the best evidence of the under-
standing of the parties, even though, 
through a defect of form or by reason of 
some positive provision of law, it cannot 
have the effect intended for it. No other 
language is admissible to show what the 
parties meant or intended, for the reason 
that each has made the instrument the 
agreed test of his meaning and intention. 
The rule rests upon a rationale foundation 
of experience and policy and is essential 
to the certainty and stability of written 
obligations. It is designed to permit a 
party to a written contract to protect him-
self against perjury, infirmity of memory, 
or the death of witnesses. (Emphasis 
added) . 
See also Stanley v. Deseret Foods Corp., 93 Utah 577, 74 
P.2d 1221 (1938) and Andrus v. Blazzard, 23 Utah 233, 63 P. 
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The very things appellant says are issues of fact- i.e. 
the prior oral arrangements and their terms - are the very 
things the rule is designed to exclude. 
The third issue of fact the appellants point to, i.e. 
"what are the terms of the partnership agreement?" is 
answered: The written document speaks for itself. The 
Court's first summary judgment simply said the terms of the 
partnership was the written agreement. The interpretation 
and application of those terms was left to the balance of 
the determination in the second summary judgment and are 
discussed in Point III hereof, and was not material to that 
motion for summary judgment. 
The trial court properly entered judgment that the 
written agreement entered into by appellants and respondent 
which set out the terms for operating and r1isolving the 
partnership would be the measure of the rights and lia-
bilities of these parties. Such action is clearly supportec 
by the law as set out above. 
POINT III 
THE TERMS OF THE WRITTEN PARTNERSHIP ARE CLEAR AS TO 
DISSOLUTION. THE COURT PROPERLY GRANTED SUt-lt1IARY JUDGIIENT I' 
ACCORDANCE WITH THOSE TERMS. 
In May of 1970, appellant David Heaberlin had an argu-
ment with Lou Melendez, which Mr. Heaberlin describes as 
"mostly my fault." (Deposition of Thurr:1an David Heaberlin, 
p. 17 Line 7). A couple of weeks later ~lr. Heaberlin met 
with his counsel, t,lr. Taylor; the rE'sponnrnt, ~lr. ~lelendez' 
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and respondents' counsel, Mr. Lewis. It was agreed at that 
meeting that Mr. Heaberlin would stay with the carnival and 
some talk was had of a possible re-negotiation of the existing 
partnership agreement. (Deposition of Thurman David Heaber-
lin, p. 17 Line 19-22). At that meeting Mr. Heaberlin was 
paid $1,100.00. (Deposition of Thurman David Heaberlin p. 
18, Lines 7-14). After the meeting, Mr. Heaberlin said he 
"changed his mind and decided not to stay in the company." 
(Deposition of Thurman David Heaberlin, p. 18, Lines 17-18). 
Mr. Heaberlin then took his own personal belongings, his 
shop truck, a house trailer and a station wagon and, without 
contacting Mr. Melendez, voluntarily left the business and 
went to California. (Deposition of Thurman David Heaberlin, 
p. 18-21). Mr. Heaberlin was not forced out of the business, 
nor was there any mutual agreement made as to termination as 
claimed in appellants brief. Appellants own testimony 
indicates that appellants, after a meeting where he agreed 
to stay with the carnival, changed his mind and voluntarily 
left of his own accord. 
The partnership agreement entered into between appellants 
(David and Margie Heaberlin) and respondent (Louis Melendez) 
provides as follows regarding dissolution: 
10. Dave, if he elects to leave the firm 
will never be allowed to leave with any 
piece of property except for the inventory 
he filed at beginning of agreement and any 
added to list by Lou bought personally by 
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12. As carnival is efficient only in size 
at no time will the unit ever be divided 
for disolvement of partnership. 
13. Dave will be paid, in case if disolve-
ment, price agreed upon or by amount of 
stock paid into corporation by him and in 
no case more than the $25,000.00 agreed pur-
chase price and in sa~e time period as paid 
for unless otherwise agreed upon. 
(Deposition of Thurman David Heaberlin, 
Exhibit 1). 
The partnership agreement provides that upon dis-
solution, appellants will get (1) Inventory of equipment 
brought into partnership; (2) Amount paid into partnership 
but not more than $25,000.00. When appellant left, he took 
with him all of his personal property, the items in No. 1 
and 2 above, a 1967 station wagon, a house trailer, and 
$1,100.00 which was paid to him by respondents at the 
meeting between respondents and appellants and their respec-
tive attorneys. (Deposition of Thurman David Heaberlin, p. 
18-21). 
The only amount appellant had paid into the partnersh~ 
pursuant to paragraph 8 and 13 was a credit of $776.50 as 
1/2 of a check retained by Lou Melendez in the amount of 
$1,553.00. (Deposition of Thurman David Heaberlin p. 13; 
Deposition of Lou Melendez, p. 38 Lines 24-40, Line 22, 
Affidabit of Lou Helendez, R. 37). The cash paid appellant 
just prior to his leaving, therefore, represented a payment 
of the amount due to appellant under paragraphs 8 and 13, 
plus an additional $323.50. 
-1 
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When the court held the hearing on this matter February 
6, 1974, after it had granted summary judgment on the issue 
of the partnership agreement, these facts were not yet 
clearly in the mind of the Court. (See transcript of the 
hearing, R. 270-298). As the nature of appellants claim at 
that point was dissolution and accounting according to the 
terms of the partnership agreement, the court decided not to 
go into the facts of the matter at that time. (R. 292). 
The court decided instead to appoint a master. When the 
name of a master suitable to both parties was agreed upon, 
the court indicated it would prepare an order for the master 
and then refer the matter to the master. (R. 292-294). 
Thereafter, on March 1, 1977, respondents prepared a 
motion for summary judgment on the issue of the accounting 
and dissolution and supported it with the affidavit of Lou 
Melendez. (R. 31-42). Respondent's affidavit stated with 
particularity the items and monies that were due and that 
had been distributed and that all that was due had been 
distributed. In responding to respondent's motion for 
summary judgment, appellants filed no counter affidavit 
contesting the facts set forth in respondents affidavit. 
Appellants merely attached copies of earlier affidavits 
dated January 24, 1973, which dealt with the issue of the 
terms of the partnership agreement and which had been sub-
mitted in opposition to respondent's earlier motion for 
summary judgment on the issue of the partnership. (R. 31). 
-19 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
With no counter affidavits contesting the facts re-
garding dissolution and distribution as set forth in res-
pondents affidavits, the facts as stated therein are uncon-
troverted facts. The purpose of a mot ion for summary judgmen: 
is to go beyond the pleadings or the mere allegations of 
the parties to determine what evidence is available and 
which issues are in fact contested. Mere allegations will 
not withstand a motion for summary judgment. See Menlove v. 
Salt Lake County, 18 Utah 2d 203, 418 P.2d 227, {1966); 
Dupler v. Yates, 10 Utah 2d 251, 351 P.2d 624 {1960). 
On the basis of these facts now clearly presented to 
the Court, the Court could rightly conclude the following: 
1) No master was necessary; 2) the terms of the partnersh~ 
agreement specifically stated that the assets of the partne~ 
ship were not to be divided but were to remain with the Ci~ 
of Fun Carnival and that appellant was to take his personal 
property only and was to be paid what ever he had actually 
paid in pursuant to the agreement; 3) that appellants had 
paid in $776.50; 4) that appellant had been paid $1,100.00 
and had taken the property to which he had been entitled, all 
as outlined in the uncontroverted affidavit of respondents. 
(R. 31-42). Summary judgment was, therefore, the appro-
priate remedy for respondent. 
Appellant, in Point III of his brief, argues that theR 
were three genuine issues of fact which should have prevente 
the court from granting summary judgment. They are: 
-20-
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A. THE LOWER COURT RULED THAT THERE WAS A 
PARTNERSHIP AND ORDERED AN ACCOUNTING. 
B. WHAT \'lAS THE VALUE OF THE PARTNERSHIP? 
C. WHAT WERE THE TERMS OF THE DISSOLUTION? 
None of these three presents a genuine issue of fact. 
A. - The lower court did rule on the issue of the 
partnership pursuant to Rule 56(d) which left the question 
of the accounting to be determined. The court, as explained 
above, was going to appoint a master to take evidence and 
report back to the court. When the facts of the case relating 
to the accounting were presented upon respondents motion for 
summary judgment, however, the court rightly concluded that 
a master would not be necessary. Appellants cite no authority 
because there is no authority stating that once the court 
has granted summary judgment on one issue, that it cannot 
later grant summary judgment on some or all other issues if 
the facts and the law warrant it. 
B. - The value of the partnership assets does not enter 
into the dissolution of the partnership according to the terms 
of the partnership agreement entered into by appellants and 
respondents. The terms of the partnership agreement state 
that Heaberlin will not take any of the assets with him but 
that he will be paid what he has actually paid in. The 
uncontroverted facts in respondent's affidavit and according 
to the depositions of appellant as set forth above, is that 
the only amount paid in by appellants was more than paid 
back to him on dissolution. ~he value of the partnerships, 
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therefore, was not material to the dissolution under the 
terms of the agreement. 
C. - The terms of the dissolution were set forth in the 
partnership agreement and the actions of the parties upon 
dissolution were set out in respondents affidavit and uncon-
tested by appellant. 
The trial court was therefore correct in granting 
summary judgment on the sole remaining issue of the 
accounting, dissolution and distribution and respondent 
urges this Court to affirm that judgment. 
In responding to Point V which also goes to the issue 
of the second summary judgment entered by the court, res-
pondent asserts that appellant is misreading the rule. The 
only facts "established" by a partial summary judgments a~ 
those facts the court finds at that time to be without 
substantial controversy. All remaining issues are to be the 
subject of further proceeding. In his first motion for 
summary judgment (R. 216) respondent specifically asked that 
the issue of the written partnership agreement be decided. 
This is all that the court considered and all that the court 
decided. Certainly, this cannot be said to preclude the 
court from later deciding any other issue properly present~ 
to the court. 
-22-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
CONCLUSION 
By the nature of the proceedings in the lower court, 
this matter is divided into two issues: 1) the terms of the 
partnership as determined in the trial court's first summary 
judgment, and 2) the dissolution and distribution according 
to those terms in the trial court's second summary judgment. 
As to the first summary judgment, appellants failed to 
preserve their right to appeal and have waived any objec-
tions they now attempt to assert. Even if this Court con-
eludes, however, that the first summary judgment is reviewable 
at this time, the trial court's action is fully supported by 
the law and the facts and should be sustained. 
As to the second summary judgment, the law, as outlined 
herein, and the uncontroverted facts as outlined in respon-
dents affidavit fully support the trial court's judgment. 
This litigation which has been in the courts for nearly 
eight years should now properly be brought to a close by 
affirming the trial court's actions~ein. 
Respectfully submitted this 6- day of October, 1977. 
__ , 
/ ; b~L4 ~~x-'-'LEW.IS, for: 1 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
120 East 300 North 
Provo, Utah 84601 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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